Friday, March 2, 2012

As we have been writing and saying for long that the government of India has handed over Internal security to US and Israel, it has been proved. US special forces are based in India and four other South Asian countries, aPentagon commander has confir

As we have been writing and saying for long that the government of India has handed over Internal security to US and Israel, it has been proved. US special forces are based in India and four other South Asian countries, aPentagon commander has confirmed. India quickly denied hosting American troops on its soil.

On the other hand, anti China environment is hyped altogether to provoke SINO India Clash once again!China may resort to territorial grabs, including through a "major military offensive", especially in Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, and India should respond with "a strategy of quid pro quo", says a report by an independent group of Indian analysts.

Congress downplays AK Antony's 'bugging' issue, BJP demands probe



Troubled Galaxy Destroyed Dreams, chapter 751


Palash Biswas


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As we have been writing and saying for long that the government of India has handed over Internal security to US and Israel, it has been proved. US special forces are based in India and four other South Asian countries, aPentagon commander has confirmed. India quickly denied hosting American troops on its soil.

On the other hand, anti China environment is hyped altogether to provoke SINO India Clash once again!China may resort to territorial grabs, including through a "major military offensive", especially in Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, and India should respond with "a strategy of quid pro quo", says a report by an independent group of Indian analysts.

"Our frontiers with China have been mostly stable for some years now. However, China could assert its territorial claims (especially in the Arunachal sector or Ladakh) by the use of force," says the report that seeks to outline a foreign and strategic policy for India in the 21st century.


"There is the possibility that China might resort to territorial grabs. The most likely areas for such bite-sized operations are those parts of the Line of Actual Control where both sides have different notions of where the LAC actually runs. These places are known," says the report.


Conscious of threats from China from the northeastern borders, India is inducting its indigenous Akash missiles in the region, even as its Air Force is preparing to meet the military challenge by holding a major war exercise there.

Meanwhile,Congress on Friday downplayed the controversy surrounding the alleged bugging of the office room of Defence Minister AK Antony even as the BJP demanded a thorough probe into the matter.

"According to our information. There is no such thing. Defence Ministry is saying that it was a routine thing. No such thing has been found on the basis of which it can be said that any espionage was being done," Congress spokesperson Rashid Alvi said.

He said since the issue is sensitive, further explanations can be given only by the Defence Ministry.
Another party spokesperson Abhishek Singhvi earlier said the facts in this regard were being ascertained and "certainly, if the facts turned out true, it is a very serious issue".

"Where the issue of national security is concerned, there can be no two thoughts. Let the facts be investigated. The Defence ministry will itself disclose details in this matter. If such facts come before us, you be assured, that proper action will be taken in the matter," he said.

BJP dubbed the alleged bugging as a serious matter which should be thoroughly probed and wondered what the reasons were for "spying on senior ministers of the UPA government and the failure of authorities to prevent it".
BJP spokesperson Prakash Javadekar said this was not the first such case as there were reports that Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee's office was also bugged.

BJP has decided to raise the issue in Parliament in the forthcoming Budget Session.


The US and India are working together to contain Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, blamed for the 2008 Mumbai attack, US Pacific Commander Admiral Robert Willard told a Congressional hearing Thursday.

The teams were deployed to help India in counter-terrorism, in particular in the maritime domain, Willard said.

"We have currently special forces assist teams - Pacific assist teams is the term - laid down in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives as well as India," Willard said.

"We are working very closely with India with regard to their counter-terrorism capabilities and in particular on the maritime domain but also government to government, not necessarily department of defence but other agencies assisting them in terms of their internal counter-terror and counterinsurgency challenges."

The Indian government challenged the statement.

The defence ministry said Willard's claim that US special teams were based in India was "factually incorrect".

"The report is factually incorrect in so far as the reference to India is concerned," a defence ministry spokesperson said in New Delhi.

"US special forces teams have never been stationed in India in the past, nor are such teams stationed in the country presently," he said.

Admiral Willard said Lashkar-e-Taiba was a "very dangerous organisation... so it is a very important threat, and we're working very closely with the nations in the region to help contain it".

The group was "responsible for many attacks in India, including the horrific attacks into Mumbai" of November 2008 that left 166 Indians and foreigners dead.

He said the Lashkar-e-Taiba was headquartered in Pakistan, affiliated with Al Qaeda "and contributes to terrorist operations in Afghanistan and aspires to operate against Asia, Europe and North America".

Responding to Congressman Joe Wilson, Willard said Pacific Command's Indian Engagement Initiative resourced and hosted Mumbai counter terrorist specialists for training exercises and exchanges throughout the US.

Together with capacity-building activities with South Asian partners this was mainly focused on containing LeT and contributing to counter-terrorism self-sufficiency of the sub-region's militaries, Willard said.

Anchored by India and containing major sea line of communication for the transport of energy and other commerce to Asia and the America from the Middle East and Europe, South Asia security partnerships were increasingly vital to Pacific Command's mission, he said.

South Asia is home to a confluence of challenges, including nuclear armed India and Pakistan, numerous transnational groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, piracy, trafficking in narcotics and persons, disputed borders, and insurgent movements that have plagued India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, Willard said.

Ahead of deploying two squadrons of the Akash surface-to-air missiles in the region, defence minister A K Antony will induct them into theIndian Air Force (IAF) at a ceremony in Hyderabad on Saturday, a defence ministry official said.

He will also hand over TAL, an advanced indigenously developed lightweight torpedo, to theIndian Navy.

With these two inductions into the Air Force and the Navy, India would have achieved major milestones in the development of indigenous military technology.

The two weapon systems that will greatly enhance the Air Force and the Navy's strike and air defence capabilities, have been indigenously developed and manufactured by the Hyderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Limited, a defence public sector undertaking.

Akash and TAL were developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Meanwhile, the IAF began the major war exercise in the northeast, in coordination with the Army, to test their day-night combat potential with the use of fighter planes including the potent Sukhoi-30, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar, MiG-21 Bison, apart from Mi-17 helicopters.

The Air Force also used its strategic special operations plane, C-130J from the AmericanLockheed Martin stable, besides AN-32 cargo planes, midair refuelers, and airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) platforms. The Army brought in its remotely-piloted aircraft to the operations.

Led by the IAF's Shillong-based Eastern Air Command, the exercise codenamed 'Pralay' (Apocalypse), began Feb 29, an Air Force officer said.

The exercise involves joint army-air operations by the IAF and the Indian Army's Kolkata-based Eastern Command.

"The annual exercise is aimed at testing the combat potential of the IAF in various roles such as air defence, ground support operations, counter air operations, electronic warfare, joint operations with the Army, including special operations by day and night," an officer said.

"It also includes conduct of Special Forces operations and night operations in conjunction with ground forces," the officer said.

The entire spectrum of air operations by aircraft under dense air defence environment is being practiced both by day and night.

The exercise also includes facets of network centric operations, electronic warfare as well as information warfare and all technology-intensive battle manoeuvres.

Apart from war fighting in the skies, various ground contingencies related to air force operations are being tested.

"Lessons learned from this exercise would be incorporated in future operational strategies," an Army officer said.

With massive war games, army validates new concepts

Last updated on: March 2, 2012 11:49 IST

R S Chauhan
As the summer approaches, the Indian Army is getting ready for its third massive exercise designed to test and validate some of the new concepts envisaged in the transformation process it has begun implementing in the past 18 months. These combined with joint-exercises with the US and Indonesian armies should keep our soldiers battle-hardened and in tune with modern war concepts, says R S Chauhan.
The Indian Army is getting ready for another massive exercise designed to test and validate some of the new concepts envisaged in the transformation process it has begun implementing in the past 18 months.
The South Western Command-led Exercise Shoorveer over the next three months will involve the one of India's three strike corps -- the Mathura based 1 Corps -- and the 10 Corps, located at Bhatinda in Punjab.
The initial massing of troops, tanks and other equipment has already begun in the exercise area, army sources toldrediff.com. Exercise Shoorveer, the third in quick succession after Exercise Vijayee Bhava and Exercise Sudarshan Shakti in May and November 2011. All these exercises are designed to cut the lead time for mobilisation in case of a real conflict or war and give India the edge in any possible war with Pakistan.
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Image: Soldiers during an insurgency and jungle warfare drill of Indian and Indonesian armies



FEBRUARY 29, 2012

3

Change For the Worse

Pakistan: a Dangerous Uncertainty

by JUNAID S. AHMED
Lahore.
Relations between the Pakistani government and the military have been tense recently, even resulting in rumours of an impending military coup. A coup is not very likely at this stage, but the situation has created the environment for at least one new political actor to emerge and gain popular support.
With relations between Pakistan's civilian government and military incredibly tense, speculation is rife in the Pakistani and international media of a looming military takeover. The military is allegedly buoyed by support of the Supreme Court and the country's business and political elite. However, the nature of events is changing at such a fast pace that it is difficult to predict the future.
The tenuous relationship between the government and the military appears to have finally eased somewhat since the government markedly toned down its anti-military rhetoric. Indeed, Prime Minster Yousuf Raza Gilani has extended an olive branch of sorts to the military. He had previously accused Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the head of Pakistan's principal intelligence agency, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, of acting unconstitutionally when they expressed their alleged disapproval of the government. Just before Gilani left for the World Economic Forum in Davos in the middle of February, he attempted to smooth over the difficulties with his comment that he wanted to 'dispel the impression that the military leadership acted unconstitutionally or violated rules… The current situation cannot afford conflict among the institutions.'
Tensions between these institutions reached a tipping point on 11 January 2012 when the prime minister had alleged that the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had been unlawfully interfering in a controversial court case involving the government. This amounted to accusing the heads of the army of defying the constitution and the democratically-elected government. The military was quick to warn of 'very serious ramifications' and 'grievous consequences' if the government continued its confrontational posturing. The warning fuelled rumours that the army was planning a coup to force the four year-old PPP-led coalition from office. Later that day, Gilani found himself on the receiving end of the army's ire when he sacked the defence secretary, Retired-General Khalid Naeem Lodhi, a confidante of Pakistan's Chief of Armed Services, General Kayani. The person holding the pivotal defence secretary position acts as the liaison between the military and the government.
Lodhi's dismissal stemmed from his support of the military in the 'memo-gate' case. This court case revolves around the scandal that emerged from a memo allegedly sent to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in the aftermath of the raid in May 2011 by American forces on Osama Bin Laden's hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. The memo sought the help of the US government to topple the military leadership and to replace it with people more compliant with US designs. While the authenticity of the memo remains uncertain, for the already volatile political landscape of Pakistan the implications of its revelation were explosive. Since the memo had been made public, the government has been under fire, resulting in a petition filed in the Supreme Court.
The resulting crisis saw the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government trying to deal with the matter through a parliamentary committee. However, the leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) filed a petition at the Supreme Court, which then claimed jurisdiction over the matter, side-stepping the parliamentary committee. The court enjoys the full support of the army leadership, and Kayani and Pasha have both filed briefs supporting the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The military's indignation is rooted in its belief that the memo was treasonous and that that it will dent the morale of the armed forces.
Gilani's recent retraction of his anti-military statements in January came on the heels of another very public war of words, this one between the PPP government and the Supreme Court. Regarding the public spat with the army, Gilani claimed his comments had been misinterpreted as he had meant to target only 'certain functionaries'. This stance convinced no one. There is speculation that Gilani's backtracking resulted from a secret deal between the government and the army, agreed to in a closed-door meeting between Gilani, Kayani, and Pasha. Such a scenario is not unlikely, considering the unencumbered control the military continues to enjoy over national security, foreign policy and relations with the US.
Scattered reports regarding the alleged secret deal surprised observers who have monitored long-standing tensions between the military leadership and the PPP-led government. The Supreme Court, while toning down its confrontation with PPP leaders, has not withdrawn its cases against the government. Apart from memo-gate, the court is also presiding over a case that will likely order the government to reopen corruption cases pertaining to Swiss accounts held by PPP co-chairman Pakistani president, Asif Ali Zardari. The court indicted Gilani, and his contempt of court trial – which has overshadowed the memo-gate scandal – will play out over the next few weeks.
Pakistan's political turmoil comes amidst the population's worsening socio-economic conditions. Extreme inequality and poverty reflect the endemic corruption of, and catastrophic social policies pursued by, Pakistan's rulers. Elite cronyism and patronage systems pervade every social, economic, and political aspect of Pakistani life.
The three tiers of the state – the executive, legislature and judiciary – are steeped in corruption and malfeasance. A central problem regarding the crisis scenario being probed by the Supreme Court is that it obscures several other important problems besetting the country. One striking oversight seems to be the judiciary's indifference towards the army's role in the memo-gate case, as the memo contains clear accusations regarding the army's intentions to subvert government authority and derail the democratic process. There is an increasingly prevalent view in the country that the court is dispensing selective justice which is indicative of the deeper power struggles within the state.
Furthermore, the Pakistani police and security forces are rarely perceived to protect the rights of people and the rule of law; indeed, their corruption and torture tactics are notorious and deeply feared by the population. While the media focuses on high-profile show trials, the majority of Pakistanis do not have access to basic necessities, leading to public frustration reaching extraordinary levels. The middle class is shrinking due to rising inflation and the global economic recession and corruption by the PPP is generating tremendous popular anger.
American Pressure
At the heart of the mass dissatisfaction is the US-Pakistan relationship that most Pakistanis regard as neo-colonial. There is a widespread sense that Pakistan's relationship with the United States has not served Pakistani interests and is responsible for a great deal of the current problems, including the suffocating political role of the military due to US support for various military regimes. This has led to a heightened anti-Americanism, particularly since the US invasion of Afghanistan and the expansion of the war, with drone attacks and US special-forces raids, into Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Pakistani elite seems reluctant completely to cut ties with the US because the relationship has been the bedrock of Pakistani rulers' geopolitical interests.
But increased American pressure on Pakistan to 'do more' against terrorism, coupled with mass opposition to US foreign policy, have persuaded the army to ensure it exercises untrammelled control over Pakistan's relations with Washington – at the expense of the civilian government. The Pakistani elite fears the current government lacks the legitimacy and ability to institute economic restructuring needed to win the confidence of the International Monetary Fund and foreign investors. Furthermore, the elite seems exasperated by the government's monopoly over corruption and patronage. This is a chronic disposition amongst Pakistan's oligarchs who feel that when a government is 'too corrupt' its appetites need to be tamed and other elites need to retrieve their 'fair share' of the pie.
It should be remembered that the PPP did not wholeheartedly back the 2007 mass protests against then-president Pervez Musharraf, because its former leader, Benazir Bhutto, felt the popular feeling of discontent would escape the party's control. This prompted the PPP to instead approach US President George W. Bush directly to convince him that the PPP would be a more suitable ally in his 'War on Terror'.
Since assuming power, the PPP has bent over backwards to please Washington, proving it was more pliant to US demands than the military or any other political party. However, the US continued to regard the military as the central player in Pakistani politics, with US officials talking exclusively to the military top brass in major strategic discussions.
Clearly, both the civilian government and the military high command would like to re-establish cordial relations with the US. For the past six decades the alliance with the US has been the cornerstone of the Pakistani national security establishment's geopolitical strategy. This strategy has, however, been undermined by mass antagonism to US 'Af-Pak' policies. The deteriorating ties between the government and the army have also acted as an obstacle for a united Pakistani foreign policy.
Drone war
As Pakistan wallows in perennial uncertainty, the US continues to launch drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas. The recent resumption of attacks comes after the November NATO strike on a Pakistani military check-post which killed twenty-six soldiers. Following the uproar in Pakistan, the Pentagon conceded that errors had been made, yet justified the attack as 'self-defence'. The Obama administration's failure to specify who was being targeted by the drones highlighted that Pakistani sovereignty was irrelevant to US-NATO geo-strategic objectives.
Drone attacks resumed after The New York Times published a report in December claiming that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, among other insurgent groups, had been bolstered by the halt in US drone strikes. The article concluded that the hiatus allowed for a coalition between the Taliban and sympathetic militias in Pakistan's tribal areas. Furthermore, it was claimed, the break had opened the door for a deal between the Taliban and the Pakistani government.
This NYT article – and the larger imperial discourse it fed into – acted as the pretext for the US military establishment to by-pass the Obama administration, which was attempting to rebuild trust with Islamabad, and push its military agenda.
While the US continues to justify drone attacks as an efficient way of eliminating 'terrorists', the human cost of the strikes is barely recognised. Hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent villagers have lost their lives in these assaults. The rate and intensity of the attacks can be gleaned from a report by the pro-US 'Long War' website, which conservatively estimated that US forces carried out more than 180 drone missile attacks in Pakistan in 2010 and 2011.
In the short term, it seems likely that there will be continuity in Pakistani state policy – maintaining a public posture of vocally asserting Pakistani sovereignty while strengthening the alliance with the US. While organs of the Pakistani state continue vigorously to denounce drone attacks in public, the Pakistani military and civilian elites have consented to, and sometimes even requested, these strikes.
Foreign influences
The dominant foreign influence in Pakistan is that of the US which is focused on expanding its hegemony in Central, West, and South-west Asia and in containing the influence of rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran. Washington has successfully retained Pakistan in its geo-strategic orbit, showering it with billions of dollars to enlist the Pakistani military in America's 'Af-Pak' theatre of its 'War on Terror'. However, US indifference to the Pakistani state's own geo-strategic interests has produced unfavourable results with regard to combating and curtailing terrorism, and establishing western control and stability in Afghanistan. Indeed, there has been destabilisation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the policies and approach Washington has pursued since is invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
The influence on Pakistan of political developments and political actors in Afghanistan cannot be underestimated. Ever since the US-led war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been a pivotal player because of its age-old relationship and involvement with its western neighbour. Furthermore, a significant consequence of the decade-long war was that it regenerated the long-standing tribal and kinship ties of the Pashtun people along both sides of the artificial Durand Line – the British-imposed border that separates Pakistan from Afghanistan. This has compelled many Pashtuns, who feel disenfranchised in Afghanistan despite comprising sixty percent of the population, to flee across the border into Pakistan. Washington and its NATO allies, along with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, have accused these Afghan Pashtuns of joining forces with their Pakistani Pashtun brethren, and of being primarily responsible for the resistance to foreign occupation.
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain important actors of global significance. The latter have recently been closely monitored by the Pakistani security establishment due to the emergence of its new Pakistani component, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Al-Qaeda is a marginal force and capitalises on the support that the resurgent Taliban receives from an Afghan (and Pakistani) population increasingly disgusted by western occupation and meddling.
A role-player not to be forgotten is Pakistan's long-standing foe and eastern neighbour – India. While Pakistan did make a significant shift in its policy of low intensity conflict that entailed supporting and arming non-state actors fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, it is still accused of supporting 'cross-border terrorism' in India – the most recent being the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008. The Pakistani political establishment firmly believes that India, now a partner of the US, is trying to weaken and destabilise Pakistan by expanding Indian economic and strategic influence in Afghanistan, and by supporting non-state actors inside Pakistan who are engaged in anti-state violence – especially in the province of Balochistan.
Other significant foreign influences in Pakistan include China and Saudi Arabia. China is an old Pakistani ally, and as the Pakistani military becomes frustrated with American heavy-handedness and political pressure, the Pakistani establishment increasingly looks to its alliance with China. Economic and strategic ties between Pakistan and China have greatly expanded over the past year. Saudi Arabia has always served as a useful intermediary between Pakistan and the US – at least since the Afghan 'jihad' against the Soviet Union in the 1980s – and the Saudis continue to have considerable influence on Pakistani civilian and military authorities. The Saudi monarchy often mediates and resolves conflicts within the Pakistani elite.
Pakistani nuclear project and security concerns
As might be expected, Pakistan's nuclear programme is shrouded in secrecy for national security reasons. It has, therefore, always been a difficult task to speculate on the size and nature of control mechanisms over the nuclear programme. On the whole, however, serious and credible experts are convinced that the programme is safe ,secure and firmly under the close watch of the military high command. Indeed, this is what former President Musharraf asserted whenever the US raised concerns. Western governments and think tanks, however, constantly raise concerns about the infiltration of the intelligence services and the army by extremist elements, and predict how these 'rogue' individuals may capture Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The government and military officials firmly maintain that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure because of rigorous background checks and continuous monitoring of personnel 'for extremist sympathies', and continually stress the military's scrupulous approach and careful monitoring in this regard.
Nevertheless, The Atlantic and the National Journal, in a recent joint report that cited unnamed sources, asserted that the May 2011 assassination of Osama bin Laden had renewed the fears of sections of the Pakistani establishment that the US planned to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. This fear ostensibly has made the weapons more vulnerable as the Pakistani authorities would, according to the claim, be inclined to disperse the weapons stockpile to keep its location hidden. 'Instead of transporting the nuclear parts in armoured, well-defended convoys,' the report asserted, 'the atomic bombs capable of destroying entire cities are transported in delivery vans on congested and dangerous roads.'
Pakistani authorities dismiss the assertions in this and similar reports. But repeated concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons indicate 1) propaganda pressure tactics, or 2) a genuine belief by western powers that the programme is unsafe. Analysts, however, note that it is western intervention that creates the conditions of instability that could place the weapons at the risk of 'falling into the wrong hands'. Such an eventuality will occur only in the event of serious, irreconcilable fissures within the military high command and officer corps – something which has not yet happened.
Volatile politics
The popularity of the PPP government has plummeted in the past year with persistent accusations of corruption, failure to remedy systemic economic woes and the resurgence of a politicised civil society. Besieged from all sides, the government is struggling to complete its five-year term and speculation is rife about an early election. Opposition parties are gaining ground by tapping into the mass resentment. The leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) – and charismatic former captain of Pakistan's cricket team, Imran Khan, has held several massive rallies and is emerging as a serious political contender in the upcoming general elections. One of his core platforms is uncompromising opposition to the US 'War on Terror'. Khan's position against American policies in the region and in Pakistan specifically, as well as his strong advocacy for national policies that advance greater social and economic justice in the country, has made him the most popular political figure in Pakistan.
The traditional opposition to the PPP is found in ethnic- and religious-based parties. The Pakistani elite, while occasionally patronising this opposition, feels it is neither adequately equipped to ride the storm of IMF austerity measures currently dogging Pakistan's economy nor to ensure stability in the country. There is now a view that the establishment-elite is giving tacit support to Khan's political campaign.
Concern over Pakistan's vulnerable economy coupled with a deteriorating balance of payments situation makes the country a prime candidate for a fresh loan. With a budget deficit estimated at seven percent of the GDP and with an inflation rate of twelve percent, the lax monetary policy of the State Bank of Pakistan has been severely criticised by the IMF which would like to make new loans conditional on stipulations that include a tax increase. Since the government reneged on the loan agreement negotiated in 2008, the IMF has not resumed loan instalments even in the face of the humanitarian crisis that followed the floods of 2010 and 2011. Moreover, the US has displayed an unwillingness to leverage the IMF in loan negotiations due to weakened Pakistan-US relations. Plans to appease the US include promises to reopen the US-NATO supply route from Pakistan to Afghanistan – which was effectively shut down after the November US attack.
For several decades the elite had called on the Pakistan Army to stabilise the country's political situation. However, there is now reluctance to resort to military intervention and thus derail the democratic dispensation. The military suffers from a credibility deficit as it was ousted from direct rule via a popular movement only four years ago.
Owing to the mercurial nature of Pakistani politics, even the most prudent analysts are wary of ruling out any option. As a 'senior US official' posited in a Reuters report, 'Things have calmed down in the last week or so… but this is Pakistan. Any of the players could do something unexpected.' This assessment ignores the destabilising impact of the Pakistan-US relationship which culminated in the US forcing Pakistan to 'do more' in the 'War on terror', thus ravaging the north-west Pashtun-speaking tribal areas in a bid to root out Taliban-aligned militias, and pushing Washington's neo-liberal policies through support for IMF restructuring.
Conclusion
The current deadlock between the government on the one hand and the Supreme Court and the army on the other reflects a wider, recurring trend in Pakistani politics. While the faces might change, the issues being debated and the powerful interests at stake tend to remain fairly constant.
Power struggles and fissures in leadership have been a perennial feature of the Pakistani state since independence. However, this dynamic has become exponentially dangerous in the face of ever-widening social and economic gaps between the ruling elite and the population. In the wake of new global political realities following the Middle East-North Africa uprisings, the Pakistani elite has become paralysed with fear of the growing discontent emerging from a myriad issues ranging from the 'War on terror' to economic instability and the disintegration of public infrastructure.
In an incredibly brazen acknowledgement, US President Barack Obama for the first time recently declared what had already been common knowledge in Pakistan: the US conducts drone strikes inside the country. Such a proclamation demonstrates callous disregard for the wishes of the Pakistani people and utter indifference to both the sovereignty and interests of the Pakistani state. Whether Obama has brought 'change' to America is uncertain. But as far as most Pakistanis are concerned, he certainly has brought change to Pakistan – for the worse.
Junaid S. Ahmed teaches in the Faculty of Law and Policy at the Lahore University for Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.
This article was originally published by Afro-Middle East Centre Insights.
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/29/pakistan-a-dangerous-uncertainty/

Army's massive war game to raise a 'desert storm' in Rajasthan

By MAIL TODAY REPORTER
Last updated at 8:27 PM on 26th February 2012
The army is gearing up to hold one of its biggest ever war games - Shoorveer - in Rajasthan between March and June.
The exercise, involving the army's elite 1 Strike Corps and 10 Corps under the Jaipur-based South Western Command, will see the deployment of more than 200 tanks and over 20,000 troops in the border state.
'All formations and units under South Western Command will participate to validate doctrines in a joint service environment,' army spokesperson Col Jagdeep Dahiya said.
The Sudarshan Shakti drill involved around 50,000 troops
The war game comes soon after the army's exercise Sudarshan Shakti in Pokharan to validate its new battle-fighting concepts developed after the transformation studies carried out under army chief General V.K. Singh.
The exercise, one of the biggest manoeuvres ever based on the Integrated Theatre Battle Concept, will be held in the deserts of Bikaner and Shri Ganganagar.

PREVIOUS SHOWS OF STRENGTH

SUDARSHAN SHAKTI (2011):

This exercise in Rajasthan's

Barmer-Jaisalmer sector involved around 50,000 troops and 100 tanksand artillery guns. Fighter aircraft also took part

OPERATION PARAKRAM

(2001-02): This operation was a 11-month-long border stand-off with Pakistan. It took place after the attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001

OPERATION VIJAY (1999): The army codenamed the Kargil conflict betweenIndia and Pakistan — to push back the infiltrators from across the border —as Operation Vijay

OPERATION BRASSTACKS

(1986-87): It was one of the largest mobilisations of armed forces in the subcontinent. It was held in Rajasthan during November 1986 and March 1987

'It will enable the army to validate its war fighting concepts while working towards a 'capability- based approach', relying on a series of transformational initiatives, concepts, organisational structures and absorption of newage technology,' Dahiya said.
The Western and South Western Commands of the air force are also likely to deploy their frontline aircraft, including the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, Jaguars and AWACs, for the war game.
'The joint synergy will be enhanced by the active participation of the IAF with the air assets of the army and the air force being employed in an integrated manner,' Dahiya said.
The South Western Command is being commanded by Lt. Gen. Gyan Bhushan.
Battlefield transparency and operational plans based on realtime situational awareness will be enhanced using intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) inputs from unmanned aerial vehicles, radars and satellites.
The troop and equipment mobilisation for the exercise has already begun. This will be followed by training at unit and formation levels and culminate into large scale manoeuvres.


Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2106756/Armys-massive-war-game-raise-desert-storm-Rajasthan.html#ixzz1nvt98EOV

Counter-Terrorism: The Architecture Of Failure – Analysis

Written by: SATP
February 28, 2012
By Ajai Sahni
The 26/11 attacks in Mumbai were, without doubt, a watershed event in India's experience of terrorism, and we appear to have become habituated, since, to measuring our responses, substantially, from this moment on. This is, to some extent, natural and to be expected. The 26/11 incidents were one of the largest and most shocking of terrorist attacks in India, and the sheer drama of a 62 hour siege in full glare of the media is difficult to ignore. This was, many have arguably asserted, "our 9/11″, and India's responses to Mumbai have repeatedly (and adversely) been compared to the US response to the catastrophic terrorist attacks in that country in 2001.
Such an orientation, however, fragments our concerns and responses, and pushes us into a derivative, reactive and poorly informed discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT).

India

For one thing, the reality of terrorism in India is far more enduring and complex, and the threat will persist long into the future – sheer demographics, internal and external dynamics ensure this.1 To take the case of Mumbai alone, the city has experienced repeated Islamist terrorist attacks, including the country's worst terrorist outrage, in terms of fatalities, in the serial bombings of March 12, 1993. Terrorism in Mumbai did not start with the 26/11 attacks, nor – as the bombings of July 13, 2011, demonstrate – has it ended with them.
On a wider spectrum, India's experience with Pakistan-backed irregular warfare and terrorism (not to mention other patterns of insurgency and terrorism) goes back almost to the moment of the twin and troubled birth of these two countries. Over these long decades, we have experienced tremendous and humiliating debacles, and should not shy from conceding these – Mumbai 26/11 was certainly one. But we have also had dramatic successes. India's tragedy is that the lessons of both success and failure have largely been ignored and even lost. As noted elsewhere, India's political leadership remains entirely ignorant of the operational nuts and bolts of our past counter-terrorism successes, and has chosen, instead, to rely on often dubious and inappropriate models of western 'successes', and on insubstantial political posturing. None of this has, or can, significantly diminish India's vulnerabilities to terrorist violence.2 What we have had is an overwhelmingly diversionary, politically opportunistic and misconceived emphasis on theatrical – but essentially unproductive – symbolism, with a persistent neglect of the imperatives of capacity building at the most critical levels of response.3
Unsurprisingly, despite vaunting claims of improvements to the system and unprecedented financial outlays to this end, in each year since 26/11, Union Home Minister (UHM) P. Chidambaram has found it necessary to concede, nevertheless, as he did most recently after the Delhi High Court bombings, that "all cities in India are vulnerable to attack".4
How can these positions – claims to huge and quantifiable improvements and admissions of unchanging vulnerability – be reconciled? Several factors, including, of course, the tremendous cumulative deficits of capacities in almost all structures of security and governance, have been responsible, but perspectives imposed by the inordinate focus on the 26/11 attacks have also been of significance.
It is useful in this context to recognize that Mumbai 26/11 was not a typical pattern of terrorist attack in India – though it was not unprecedented, particularly within the context of operations in Jammu & Kashmir. However, in its sheer spectacle, it has come to dominate our imagination and our concept of response, with images of incoherence and chaos. Thus, in the wake of 26/11, one commentator faulted "India's police and internal security system" which he characterized as "highly fragmented and often poorly coordinated."5
This perspective, indeed, has been echoed across principal streams of analysis of CT initiatives since. The protracted crisis of the 26/11 attacks, the pervasive sense of a loss of control, of a collapse of command, not just in Mumbai, but at the national level, have overwhelmingly informed priorities, projections and orientations. Counter-terrorism has, consequently, been conceptualized within an 'emergency response' paradigm, emphasising rapid response, command and coordination, over all else. Thus, on the one hand, we have had the deployment and raising of small, better trained and equipped, Special Forces contingents – NSG Commandos, Force 1, Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), etc. – and, on the other, vast allocations for the creation of imitative and centralizing meta-institutions that are ostensibly intended to ensure better coordination and control, but most of which will do little beyond feeding the illusion of power. Other elements, particularly deficits in general policing and intelligence capabilities, are, of course, recognized, but are ascribed a lower priority. Home Minister Chidambaram, in his Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture on December 23, 2009, thus acknowledges,

…police stations in the country are, today, virtually unconnected islands… There is no record of crimes or criminals that can be accessed by a Station House Officer, except manual records relating to that police station… we must have more police stations and, at the police station level, we must have more constables, some of whom are exclusive for gathering intelligence… the police must also be the first responder in case of a militant or terrorist attack… QRT and commando units should have modern weapons and equipment…6

Doing all this, however, "is just extracting a little more from the 'business as usual' model". The real priority, the UHM argues, is "a bold, thorough and radical restructuring of the security architecture at the national level".7
At the heart of this 'radical restructuring' is the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC), proposed to be created against an outlay of INR 3,400 crores, "by the end of 2010″,8 because "India cannot afford to wait for 36 months" (the time it took the US to establish its NCTC, the model which India seeks to imitate). A multiplicity of other 'architectural' transformations would also go into this 'radical restructuring', with additional outlays of unnumbered thousands of crores, prominently including the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), the Crimes and Criminal Tracking Network and System (CCTNS) – all these, and many existing institutions, to be brought under the overarching authority of the NCTC, within a redesigned Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA).
It is not the intention, here, to enter into a detailed critique of these ambitious proposals, but two points need to be highlighted in passing.

  • India's record of institution building over the past decades has been disastrous. We have set up numberless shell organizations, but few of these have acquired the operational efficacy envisaged. There are structural reasons for this, the most important being the unavailability of the necessary profile of human resources. With under 4.2 per cent of the population possessing anything more than a High School certificate,9 this problem is unlikely to go away any time soon. Any major institutional innovation will only cannibalize existing institutions for educated and skilled manpower; most of these institutions are already in a crisis of manpower at leadership levels. This was certainly the case with the far less ambitious National Investigative Agency, which was supposed to be 'like the FBI' – an aspiration that is, in itself, laughable.10 The fact that the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security for the NCTC took longer than the time envisaged for the setting up the organisation speaks volumes for our institutional responses and capabilities. MAC, NATGRID, CCTNS and the crucial Universal Identity Card (UID) project, among others, have been floundering for years without reaching their respective 'take off' stages.

  • The degree of centralization envisaged would create no more than an illusion of control, but the reality of a gigantic, ponderous, inevitably inefficient and potentially obstructive, bureaucracy. As has been repeatedly emphasised elsewhere, counter-terrorism is a small commanders' war,11 and the challenge is to create the widest dispersal of effective response capabilities. KPS Gill's admonition in this context has urgent relevance, that "there is no point in… the Home Minister trying to be a field marshal."12 It is useful to recall, here, that the Centre's performance in terms of its existing mandate has not been particularly encouraging. A close study of the state of any Central Agency today would demonstrate that these structures are riddled with infirmities and deficits. The Centre is, in fact, as bereft of effective capacities as are the States. Worse, regimes at the Centre have, in the past, tended to abuse, for partisan political gains, even the very limited provisions for overriding central authority that currently exist. Solutions cannot be proposed 'in an ideal world'; proposals for systemic overhaul have to take into account the political and administrative culture that prevails.

The problem with creating a centralized 'radical and new architecture' for India's security, however, is even more fundamental, and relates to our basic assessments and conceptualization of terrorism.
Terrorism is not just an incident – a bombing or a commando-style attack; and CT is not just incident and emergency response. Terrorism has become an enduring condition of our quotidian lives, and elements of the wider effort and conspiracy to engineer a terrorist act surround us at all times. CT demands a continuous capability to identify and neutralize the small, neglected, deviations, anomalies, misdemeanours and lesser crimes that culminate in the final and dramatic act of terrorism. No effective CT response can be mounted in a collapsing internal security and intelligence environment. Security is an indivisible, and there is no such thing as a 'small crime'.
Delhi's Chief Minister, on one occasion, exhorted the capital's Police to "go after terrorists and not cycle chor",13 and this is precisely the misconception that has created an enabling environment for terrorism. It is, of course, doubtful that Delhi's over-stretched Police spend any significant proportion of their time chasing 'cycle thieves' and other petty miscreants. What is important, here, is the understanding that the same networks service both petty crime and major crime, including terrorism; and the same enforcement agencies 'look the other way' when such crimes occur. The same hawala networks service corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, as well as terrorists. Smuggling channels that bring grey market goods into the country also bring in arms, ammunition and explosives.
It is useful, here, to recall Rudy Giuliani's implementation of the 'broken windows' theory14 to New York crime, while he was Mayor of that metropolis. The essential idea was a 'zero tolerance' of vandalism, petty crime and public misdemeanour on the argument that these 'lead up' to major crime. Significantly, rates of both petty and serious crime in New York fell dramatically in the decade following Giuliani's implementation of this policy.15
The general policing and intelligence environment, similarly, has a direct bearing on the execution of terrorist acts, and on the terrorist calculus of success, failure and impact. Significantly, with a threat like terrorism, it is not sufficient to try to secure principally urban targets alone – as is the overwhelming direction of present responses. Terrorist conspiracies are mounted, attacks are prepared, and perpetrators are deployed through, areas of the poorest policing, across the chaos of India's rural and mofussil expanse. It is here that networks take root and find sympathisers, support and sustenance, when the urban environment becomes operationally 'difficult'. And it is here that the hard slog of CT, the systematic penetration of networks of sympathisers, supporters and cadres, and the dismantling of this complex, has to be executed. As long as terrorist networks find spaces to thrive within an environment of ineffective policing, the challenge of 'delivering' a terrorist attack to an urban target will never be insurmountable.
This, then, is the fundamental error: shifting the focus to the institutional architecture of CT without settling the most basic questions of strategy, objectives, priorities and orientation.
Our principal problems lie, not in architecture, but in manpower, materials and execution. We have eviscerated our institutions over decades, and now believe that the solution lies in creating layer upon layer of meta-institutions to 'monitor', 'coordinate' and 'oversee' this largely dysfunctional apparatus.
In his Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture, UHM Chidambaram warned, "Routine is the enemy of innovation. Because we are immersed in routine tasks, we neglect the need for change and innovation."16
The truth, in fact, is the exact opposite. It is the quality, content, relevance and thoroughness of our 'routine' that will define our capacities for CT success. You cannot address higher order deficits and deficiencies unless the 'routine' is efficiently taken care of. In fact, while glaring deficits in 'routine' functions and capacities persist, an emphasis on meta-institutional and 'architectural' transformations becomes an evasion, an alibi for not addressing the immediate and greater crisis of basic capacities, capabilities and functions.
There is no ideal configuration or distribution of powers and functions, no grand or novel 'architecture' that can produce optimal results. The crisis is one of efficiency. Governance and administration in India – including internal security management – have failed to evolve any systems – any 'routines' – to maintain efficiency or impose accountability, and are currently operating against the imperatives of even the most rudimentary principles of management or administration. Vast resources are wasted where they produce little positive outcome. Initiatives and structures that could produce the best results are, at the same time, rejected or starved of resources. Even where leakages and inefficiencies have been well-documented, these are not corrected. It has not mattered whether this has occurred in centrally administered projects and agencies or in state administered projects and agencies. Mere structural, architectural or constitutional redistribution of powers, functions and responsibility, will achieve nothing unless issues of capacity, efficiency and accountability are addressed – in that order.
It is the regrettable truth that policing has been tremendously neglected by most State Governments, and there is now an enveloping crisis of capacities. Unless State Governments explicitly recognize the primacy of policing and of law and order management in any system of efficient governance, there is little scope for improvement.
If we are to confront and defeat proxy war, terrorism and insurgency, we must create Police Forces across India that are professional, efficient, well-resourced and accountable. It is tragic that international perceptions, today, see the Police in India as a "broken system" reflecting nothing more than "dysfunction, abuse and impunity".17 India is a rising global power, and its security apparatus must reflect, and be seen to reflect, global standards. What is needed, now, is comprehensive modernization, not just incremental upgradation of technologies. While technological inputs will be crucial, modern policing is not the outcome of technologies alone. It is the Policeman – his training, orientation, capabilities and, crucially, mindset – that makes the difference between a modern and an obsolete Police Force. It is, consequently, the profile of the Policeman – his education, training, skills and orientation – of course, but also his welfare and status in society that must undergo comprehensive revaluation.
It is useful, here, to remind ourselves, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had stated, as far back as in September 2006, and well before the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, "Unless the 'beat constable' is brought into the vortex of our counter-terrorist strategy, our capacity to pre-empt future attacks would be severely limited."18 Virtually nothing has been done to translate this idea into the realities of the ground. The 'beat constable' here, is shorthand for the complex tasks of general policing and intelligence work, the very 'routines' that we tend to dismiss with contempt.
This does not mean, of course, that innovation is to be shelved. It is clear that existing 'routines' are failing to achieve the objectives of general law and order administration as well as CT, and need transformation. However, we cannot, in this situation, cherry pick our preferred 'innovations' from international examples, or randomly from CT literature, or along personal proclivities and preferences, or along technologies and innovations that powerful vendors are trying to market. Our innovations must arise out of the documented deficits and failures of our existing 'routines', and the specificities of the projected challenges they are intended to meet. There is little publicly available evidence to suggest that this has, in fact, been the case with any of our innovations or acquisitions over the past years. We cannot, moreover, talk about strategic innovations without defining our basic strategy – and there is little sign of a coherent CT strategy on the horizon.
Of course, irrespective of the efficacy of our general policing and intelligence system, or of any 'routines' and protocols we may establish in the foreseeable future, terrorist plots will result in at least occasional success. It is at this juncture that Special Forces, QRTs, and coordination, command and control mechanisms come into play. It is important, first, to recognize that such a situation already represents a CT failure. Further, our assessment of innovative alternatives must be built on clear scenarios of terrorism and response, and not on generalized models borrowed from other countries, or constructed on untested theoretical positions.
For instance, Special Forces and QRTs would appear to have some natural utility, particularly in containing the undue protraction of an incident. However, is this evaluation based on ad hoc comparison of existing general force capabilities and optimal Special Force capabilities, or on demonstrable advantages on the ground? NSG hubs were created in four metropolii, including Mumbai, on the argument that the ten hour delay in their deployment resulted in extraordinary harm during the 26/11 attacks. But was this decision based on an objective evaluation of NSG performance after it arrived on the scene? On an evaluation of the NSG response over nearly 52 hours that followed? This does not appear to be the case. Moreover, has any effort ever been made to assess the comparative preventive efficacy of an improved general policing system, as against creation of Special Forces? The potential of a terrorist attack is ordinarily realized within its first minutes, well before any rational timeframe of deployment of commando or QRT units. Indeed, if we look back at 26/11, the most heartening aspect of the response was the extraordinary courage displayed by the ill-equipped and ill-trained local Police, including lathi-wielding constables, whose capture of Ajmal Kasab was the single most extraordinary achievement in the entire fiasco of responses. It can certainly be imagined that a better trained, equipped, and coordinated general policing apparatus would have been able to prevent most of the 26/11 attackers from reaching their targets. Has such a scenario been 'gamed' to arrive at an objective assessment of response priorities and alternative models of 'innovation'? I do not think so.
None of this is intended to argue that we need not look at the 'architecture' of security, or at 'radical' institutional innovations and developments. Rather, it is a question of settling priorities; and of excluding the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The system certainly calls for an overhaul. It is not, however, clear that such transformation needs to begin with the 'framework'. I would suggest that a focus on capacities and processes within existing institutions would bring far more tangible benefits in the near and medium term, rather than the sweeping structural changes that are currently advocated. Moreover, at least some of the proposed 'architectural' elements are unviable, redundant, or unlikely to achieve critical mass in any timeframe that would be relevant to our CT imperatives.
There is often a facile response to this: why can't we do both – basic capacity development and 'architectural innovation' – together? The simple answer to this is, because we lack the resources to do so at the scales necessary, and within timeframes imposed by the challenge of terrorism. Flinging thousands of crores in all directions is not going to serve any real purpose. While financial caps may be one of the possible impediments to simultaneous developments across existing and proposed systems, the most significant obstacle to the realization of a 'radical architecture', as already indicated, is the country's and the Governments' human resource profile, and the multiple barriers to its rapid enhancement. Other factors would include technology and rates of absorption; the pace of process and administrative evolution; and the psychological resistance to change that will be felt at all levels of transformation.
If we are to prioritize necessary transformations, consequently, it is content that must be given precedence over form. The crisis in India today is one of capacities, and this cannot be addressed by the reinvention of institutional forms. It doesn't matter if our responses are centralised or decentralised, as long as the executive agencies remain infirm, under-manned, under-trained and under-equipped. Issues of mandate and structure will become relevant only after the issues of capacity and capability have been addressed.
Theoretically, however, even if the capacities issue is addressed, centralization would still tend to fail in the very complex and vast Indian system, as well as the country's political and cultural environment. Given India's size and diversity, a centralized authority is necessary – and already exists in the form of the Government of India, and within it, the UMHA. However, since national (security) administration involves complex and multifarious functions, these can only be addressed through delegation to a progressively decentralised structure, with clear mandate and accountability. No single agency or authority could ever effectively tackle all aspects of national security management across the length and breadth of the country without turning into a colossal bureaucratic nightmare.
National security is, of course, a national issue – but that does not necessarily imply that it is a 'central' (Union Government) issue. There is no reason to believe that the States are 'anti-national', or are incapable of tackling issues just because they have trans-State ramifications.
India is certainly not an impotent state – and this has been proven in victories against terrorists in the past, certainly in Punjab,19 and more recently in Tripura20 and Andhra Pradesh21. This experience needs to be studied in great details, and its lessons must be widely understood within the security community – not in reductionist slogans, as is often the present case, but in the full complexity of the dynamics of terrorism and CT. India has the power, but fails both because of the lack of political will and a tremendous incoherence in strategy. There has to be a far more profound and better informed strategic and policy discourse in the country before the Government can be held to account for its persistent failures to do what very obviously needs to be done.
The priorities of our CT responses are easily derived from the preceding arguments, and it must be clear that a wide range of initiatives can be taken by the Police leadership itself, though, quite naturally, with some support from State Governments, and the Centre's financial backing. It is useful to highlight some of the immediate possibilities:

  • The highest priority must be given to improving the profile of the average Policeman in the street. While tremendous emphasis is now rightly placed on Police-population ratios, numbers are not everything. This is dramatically borne out by the experience in Andhra Pradesh. In 2005, Andhra Pradesh was among the States worst afflicted by Maoist violence, with all 23 of its Districts in acute crisis. A focused campaign through 2006 and 2007 decimated the Maoists, reducing the insurgency to a marginal irritant in just eight border Districts, where Maoists continue to launch occasional attacks, principally against civilian targets. Crucially, the Andhra Pradesh Police-population ratio in 2006 was just 98 per 100,000, and, in 2007 had fallen to 96 per 100,000, as against an all-India average of 126 and 125, in these years, respectively. An undermanned system cannot, of course, maintain exceptional levels of efficiency indefinitely, but the Andhra Police has demonstrated what can be achieved even with severely limited manpower.22 Every Police Force in India currently has entrenched inefficiencies built into existing processes of administration, deployment and operation. Large proportions of Police Forces are ordinarily wasted in static and unproductive deployments, without clear mandates or objectives within a security, crime-fighting or CT framework. It is necessary to make an objective evaluation of current processes and deployments to identify areas of redundancy and waste, and to redeploy the 'recovered' manpower more efficiently. The objective is to operationalize the largest possible proportion of the Force, and to empower each Policeman, through reorientation, training and technology, to secure the specific purposes for which he is deployed. Greater Police efficiency will also change public perceptions. Both perceptions and efficiency would, moreover, be significantly improved by addressing issues of welfare and the skill/education profile of the constabulary.

  • The world is changing at an unprecedented pace – new techniques, technologies, systems, structures and dynamics evolve on an almost daily basis. Most people in Government and in the security system remain insulated from an overwhelming proportion of these transformations, and have little capacity to absorb and adapt to all but the most obvious technological manifestations of these transformations, and to integrate these into the operational structures of their institutions. The training and education of officers and personnel, in these circumstances, must be a continuous and intensive process, must be fully resourced, must be built into the pattern and schedule of their responsibilities, and must produce quantifiable improvements in skills and capabilities. Programmes must create domain expertise for specialised officers on CT and crime-fighting strategy and tactics. Simultaneously, they must create at least minimal awareness of this context among all leadership cadres in the Force, and define and disseminate, across the Force, the strategic and tactical fundamentals of CT and crime-fighting responses.

  • If national security is to be assured, it is now necessary to frame certain consensual minimal standards of policing across the country. These standards need to be applied both across urban centres and rural jurisdictions. The Centre has, for instance, asked all States in the country to establish and maintain a 'desirable' Police-population ratio of 220 per 100,000.23 The evolution and maintenance of a range of minimum standards across other quantifiable parameters is an urgent necessity.

  • An accelerated recruitment programme to fill all sanctioned posts in the Force should be the highest priority within a time-bound framework. Sanctioned strengths must also be continuously revaluated in the context of emerging tasks and challenges.

  • The 'virtually unconnected islands' that are our Police Stations today must be brought into the national CCTNS network at the earliest. Such data networks should have been established in this country, decades ago. Reports indicate that many States are lagging in the execution of the State Wide Area Network (SWAN) and State Data Centre (SDC) components of the CCTNS project. The highest priority must now be ascribed to executing the State components of this project.

  • Each State Police establishment must evolve and implement effective 'routines' or protocols, not only for CT responses, but for all principal tasks and duties of enforcement. These protocols must, moreover, be translated into efficient practice through intensive training programmes and drills. Every Policeman must see himself as being clearly tasked, mandated, trained and equipped to fulfil clear sets of objectives.

  • Every Policeman must have a basic level of fitness and weapons' skills to respond effectively in an emergency, if required. The weapons' skills of State Armed Police contingents need dramatic enhancement – with whatever weapons they may possess. Even the antiquated .303 rifle, in the hands of a skilled shooter, can prove to be an extremely effective weapon, especially where the advantage of numbers and initiative are on the side of the Police.

  • The intelligence component of the State Police establishment, in most cases, requires exponential augmentation, and must have an effective presence in each Police Station, particularly in the rural and mofussil hinterland. Capacities to gather intelligence of evidentiary value also need to be established, so that effective prosecutions can be launched, and convictions secured. While CT may be regarded as a priority in this context, effective capabilities for all crime are necessary. The final act of terrorism is ordinarily the culmination of a succession of lesser offenses, and effective CT requires that the chain be broken at the earliest stage possible. Intelligence flows generated through the State apparatus must interface in real time with the national databases, including MAC and CCTNS.

  • Even though no consensus can be reached on a national CT strategy, it is imperative that the security establishment, even at the level of individual States or within the Police department, defines its own strategic perspectives. Unless this is done, there is little possibility of ensuring coherence in tactical response, technological acquisitions, or institutional and process innovations.

  • Technical/ Technological acquisitions must be reconciled with plans and programmes. Tremendous waste has resulted in the past with poor timing of acquisitions, or with partial provision for some elements of a programme, while others are left out.

  • A permanent and empowered Technology Evaluation Group, which proactively assesses appropriate, emerging and horizon technologies for their suitability and cost-effectiveness for CT and enforcement objectives, and makes continuous recommendations, including those on pricing structures, to the State Police leaderships, should be established in each State. Such evaluations must be made on the basis of direct contact and familiarity with the demands of the field.

Notes:
1. See Ajai Sahni, "External Policy Dimensions of India's Internal Security," in Santosh Kumar (Ed.) In the National Interest, New Delhi: BS Books, 2011, pp. 45-63.
2. Ajai Sahni, "US anti-terror model is fallible; it's not for us", Firstpost.com, September 11, 2011.
3. Ibid.
4. "All Indian cities are vulnerable, says Chidambaram", The Hindustan Times, July 15, 2011.
5. Paul Staniland, "Improving India's Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai", CTC Sentinal, Volume 2, Issue 4, page 11, April 2009.
6. P. Chidambaram, "A New Architecture for India's Internal Security", Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture, December 23, 2009.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Richard P. Adler (Rapporteur), "Minds on Fire: Enhancing India's Knowledge Workforce", Report of the Second Annual Joint Round Table on Communications Policy, Aspen Institute , 2007, p. 26.
10. See, for instance, Ajai Sahni, "A Triumph of Form over Content", Seminar, No. 593, January 2009. The NIA's mandate is nothing comparable to the FBI's, and its budget is a tiny, indeed, insignificant fraction of the latter's. The FBI's budget for FY 2012, for instance, is well over USD 8 billion. The NIA's budget for 2011-12 is INR 556.8 million (about USD 12.53 million).
11. See, for instance, Ajai Sahni, "Capacity and Infirmity in Counterterrorism", Outline Presentation at the Afternoon Debate at Committee Room 3, The House of Lords.
12. KPS Gill, "Do we want our troops to get stuck like the Americans in Afghanistan?" interview in Tehelka, Volume 6, Issue 42, October 24, 2009.
13. "Go after terrorists and not cycle chor, CM to cops", The Times of India, September 17, 2008.
14. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety", The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982.
15. William H. Sousa & George L. Kelling, "Policing Does Matter", City Journal, Winter 2002.
16. Op. cit.
17 "India: Broken System – Dysfunction, Abuse and Impunity in the Indian Police", Human Rights Watch, 2009.
18. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "Remarks on Internal Security at Chief Ministers' Conference", September 5, 2006, http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm.
19. See, KPS Gill, "Endgame in Punjab: 1988-93″, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution, Volume 1, ICM-Bulwark Books, May 1999, pp. 1-72.
20. See, Insurgency & Special Challenges to Policing in India's Northeast: Case Study of Tripura, Institute for Conflict Management study for the Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2006.
21. See, Ajai Sahni, "The State Advances, the Maoist Retreat", South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 10, September 17, 2007.
22. Ajai Sahni, "See no evil, hear no evil, do no good", South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 10 No.10, September 13, 2011.
23. "Police system neglected, needs urgent reform: Chidambaram" Sify News, October 27, 2009.
(Paper Distributed at the National Seminar on Counter-terrorism Organised by Force 1, Mumbai Police; BPR&D; and the Strategic Foresight Group On November 24, 2011 at Mumbai)
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28022012-counter-terrorism-the-architecture-of-failure-analysis-2/

Special Forces (United States Army)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Green Berets" redirects here. For other uses, see Green Berets (disambiguation).
U.S. Army Special Forces
US Army Special Forces SSI.png
United States Army Special Forces shoulder sleeve insignia
Active19 June 1952 – present
CountryUnited States United States of America
BranchUnited States Department of the Army Seal.svg United States Army
TypeSpecial Operations Forces
RolePrimary tasks:
  • Unconventional warfare
  • Foreign internal defense
  • Special reconnaissance
  • Direct action
  • Counter-terrorism
  • Hostage rescue

Other roles:

  • Counterproliferation
  • Information operations
  • Humanitarian missions
Size ~5,500 Active Duty

~1,100 National Guard

Part of Special Operations Specops Army.svg United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
NicknameGreen Berets, Quiet Professionals,[1]Soldier-Diplomats, Snake Eaters, Bearded Bastards[2]
MottoDe oppresso liber
U.S. Army's translation: "To Liberate the Oppressed"
EngagementsCold War
Vietnam War
Operation Urgent Fury
Operation Just Cause
Gulf War
Operation Enduring Freedom
Iraq War
Afghanistan War

The United States Army Special Forces, also known as the Green Beretsbecause of their distinctive service headgear, are a special operations force tasked with six primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, hostage rescue, and counter-terrorism. The first two emphasize language, cultural, and training skills in working with foreign troops. Other duties include combat search and rescue (CSAR), security assistance,peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian demining, counter-proliferation, psychological operations, manhunts, and counter-drug operations; other components of the United States Special Operations Command or other U.S. government activities may also specialize in these secondary areas.[3] Many of their operational techniques are classified, but some nonfiction works[4] and doctrinal manuals are available.[5][6][7]

The original and most important mission of the Special Forces was "unconventional warfare."

Currently, Special Forces units are deployed in Operation Enduring Freedom. They are also deployed with other SOCOM elements as one of the primary American military forces in the ongoing War in Afghanistan. As a special operations unit, Special Forces are not necessarily under the command authority of the ground commanders in those countries. Instead, while in theater, SF soldiers may report directly to United States Central Command, USSOCOM, or other command authorities.

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) highly secretive Special Activities Division(SAD) and more specifically its elite Special Operations Group (SOG) recruits soldiers from the Army's Special Forces.[8] Joint Army Special Forces and CIA operations go back to the famed MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War.[9] This cooperation still exists today and is seen in the war in Afghanistan.[10][11]

Contents

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[edit]Mission

The main mission of the Special Forces was to train and lead unconventional warfare (UW) forces, or a guerrilla force in an occupied nation that no one is allowed to know. The Special Forces are the only U.S. Special Operations Force (SOF) trained to employ UW. The 10th Special Forces Group was the first deployed SF unit, intended to operate UW forces behind enemy lines in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. As the United States became involved in Southeast Asia, it was realized that specialists trained to lead guerrillas could also help defend against hostile guerrillas, so SF acquired the additional mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), working with Host Nation (HN) forces in a spectrum of counter-guerrillaactivities from indirect support to combat command.[citation needed][clarification needed]

Special Forces personnel qualify both in advanced military skills and the regional languages and cultures of defined parts of the world. While they have a Direct Action (DA) capability, other units, such as Rangers, are more focused on overt direct action raids conducted in uniform but potentially behind enemy lines. SF personnel have the training to carry out covert DA, and other missions, including clandestine SR. Other missions include peace operations, counter-proliferation, counter-drug advisory roles, and other strategic missions. As strategic resources, they report either to USSOCOM or to a regional Unified Combatant Command.[citation needed][clarification needed]

SF team members work closely together and rely on one another under isolated circumstances for long periods of time, both during extended deployments and in garrison. Because of this, they develop clannish relationships and long-standing personal ties. SF non-commissioned officers (NCO) often spend their entire careers in Special Forces, rotating among assignments to detachments, higher staff billets, liaison positions, and instructor duties at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Special Forces officers, on the other hand, historically spend a limited amount of time early in their careers assigned to SF detachments. They are then required to move to staff positions or to higher command echelons. With the creation of USSOCOM, SF commanders have risen to the highest ranks of U.S. Army command, including command of USSOCOM, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[citation needed]

[edit]History

Main article: History of the United States Army Special Forces
[icon] This section requires expansion.

The United States Army Special Forces were formed in 1952, initially under the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division headed by then Brigadier General Robert A. McClure.[12][unreliable source?]

Since their establishment in 1952, Special Forces soldiers have operated in Vietnam, El Salvador, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and, in an FID role, Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa, which was transferred to Africa Command in 2008.[citation needed]

[edit]Organizational structure

Structure of United States Army Special Forces Command

[edit]Special Forces Group

Green Berets from the seven special forces groups stand in formation.

U.S. Army Special Forces is divided into five active duty (AD) and two Army National Guard(ARNG) Special Forces groups. Each Special Forces Group (SFG) has a specific regional focus. The Special Forces soldiers assigned to these groups receive intensive language and cultural training for countries within their regional area of responsibility (AOR).[13] Due to the increased need for Special Forces soldiers in the War on Terror, all Groups—including those of the National Guard (19th and 20th SFGs)—have been deployed outside of their areas of operation (AOs), particularly to Iraq and Afghanistan. A recently released report showed Special Forces as perhaps the most deployed SOF under SOCOM, with many soldiers, regardless of Group, serving up to 75% of their careers overseas, almost all of which had been to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Until recently an SF Group has consisted of three Battalions, but since the Department of Defense has authorized U.S. Army Special Forces Command to increase its authorized strength by one third, a fourth Battalion will be activated in each active component Group by 2012.[citation needed]

A Special Forces Group is historically assigned to a Unified Combatant Command or a theater of operations. The Special Forces Operational Detachment C or C-detachment (SFODC) is responsible for a theater or a major subcomponent, which can provide command and control of up to 18 SFODAs, three SFODB, or a mixture of the two. Subordinate to it are the Special Forces Operational Detachment Bs or B-detachments (SFODB), which can provide command and control for six SFODAs. Further subordinate, the SFODAs typically raise company- to battalion-sized units when on unconventional warfare missions. They can form 6-man "split A" detachments that are often used for Strategic Reconnaissance (SR).

InsigniaGroup
1sfg.svg
1st Special Forces Group – Headquartered at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington along with its 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, its 1st Battalion is forward deployed at Torii Station, Okinawa. The 1SFGA is oriented towards the Pacific region, and is often tasked byPACOM. Currently, 1SFGA and two of its battalions spend roughly six months out of every twelve deployed on a rotational basis to either Iraq as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula, to Afghanistan as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, or to the Philippines as Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines.
3sfg.svg
3rd Special Forces Group – Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 3SFGA is theoretically oriented towards all of Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of the Eastern Horn of Africa, i.e. AFRICOM. In practice, 3SFGA and two of its battalions spend roughly six months out of every twelve deployed to Afghanistan as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan.
5sfg.svg
5th Special Forces Group – Headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The 5SFGA is oriented towards the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa (HOA), and is frequently tasked by CENTCOM. Currently, 5SFGA and two of its battalions spend roughly six months out of every twelve deployed to Iraq as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula.
7th Special Forces Group.svg
7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) – Headquartered at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The 7SFG(A) is oriented towards the western hemisphere: South America, Central America, the Caribbean (i.e. the USSOUTHCOM AOR), and North America (i.e. the USNORTHCOM AOR). In practice, 7SFG(A) and two of its battalions spend roughly six months out of every twelve deployed to Afghanistan as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan. (In 2011, 7SFGA relocated from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida as part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.
USA - 10th Special Forces Flash.svg
10th Special Forces Group – Headquartered at Fort Carson, Colorado along with its 2nd, 3rd and newly added 4th Battalions, its 1st Battalion is forward deployed in the Panzer Kaserne (Panzer Barracks) in Böblingen near Stuttgart, Germany. The 10SFGA is theoretically oriented towards Europe, mainly Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon and Northern Africa, i.e. EUCOM. In practice, 10SFGA and two of its battalions spend roughly six months out of every twelve deployed to Iraq as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula.
19sfg.svg
19th Special Forces Group – One of two National Guard Special Forces Groups. Headquartered in Draper, Utah, with companies inWashington, West Virginia, Ohio, Rhode Island, Colorado, California, and Texas, the 19SFGA is oriented towards Southwest Asia (shared with 5SFGA), Europe (shared with 10SFGA), as well as Southeast Asia (shared with 1SFGA).
20sfg.svg
20th Special Forces Group – One of two National Guard Special Forces Groups. Headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, with battalions in Alabama (1st Battalion), Mississippi (2nd Battalion), and Florida (3rd Battalion), with assigned Companies and Detachments in North Carolina ; Chicago, Illinois; Louisville, Kentucky; Western Massachusetts; and Baltimore, Maryland. The 20SFGA has an area of responsibility (AOR) covering 32 countries, including Latin America south of Mexico, the waters, territories, and nations in the Caribbean sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the southwestern Atlantic Ocean. Orientation towards the region is shared with 7SFGA.
Inactive Groups
6sfg.svg
6th Special Forces Group – Active from 1963 to 1971. Based at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. Assigned to Southwest Asia (Iraq, Iran, etc.) and Southeast Asia. Many of the 103 original Son tay raider volunteers were from 6SFGA.
8th SFG beret flash.gif
8th Special Forces Group – Active from 1963 to 1972. Responsible for training armies of Latin America in counter-insurgency tactics.
11thSFG Flash.png
11th Special Forces Group – Active from 1961 to 1994.
12SFG beret flash.svg
12th Special Forces Group – Active from 1961 to 1994.

[edit]Battalion HQ Element – SF Operational Detachment-C (SFODC) composition

The SFODC, or "C-Team", is the headquarters element of a Special Forces Battalion. As such, it is a command and control unit with operations, training, signals and logistic support responsibilities to its three subordinate line companies. A Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) commands the battalion and the C-Team and the battalion Command Sergeant Major (E-9) is the senior NCO of the battalion and the C-Team. There are an additional 20–30 SF personnel who fill key positions in Operations, Logistics, Intelligence, Communications and Medical. A Special Forces battalion usually consists of four companies: "A", "B", "C", and Headquarters/Support.[citation needed]

[edit]Company HQ Element – SF Operational Detachment-B (SFODB) composition

A Special Forces company commander meets with village elders and members in the Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2007.

The ODB, or "B-Team", is the headquarters element of a Special Forces company, and it is usually composed of 11–13 soldiers. While the A-team typically conducts direct operations, the purpose of the B-Team is to support the company's A-Teams both in garrison and in the field. When deployed, in line with their support role, B-Teams are usually found in more secure rear areas. However, under some circumstances a B-Team will deploy into a hostile area, usually to coordinate the activities of multiple A-Teams.[citation needed]

The ODB is led by an 18A, usually a Major, who is the Company Commander (CO). The CO is assisted by his Company Executive Officer (XO), another 18A, usually a Captain. The XO is himself assisted by a Company Technician, a 180A, generally a Chief Warrant Officer Three, who assists in the direction of the organization, training, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and operations for the company and its detachments. The Company Commander is assisted by the Company Sergeant Major, an 18Z, usually a Sergeant Major. A second 18Z acts as the Operations Sergeant, usually a Master Sergeant, who assists the XO and Technician in their operational duties. He has an 18F Assistant Operations Sergeant, who is usually a Sergeant First Class. The company's support comes from an 18D Medical Sergeant, usually a Sergeant First Class, and two 18E Communications Sergeants, usually a Sergeant First Class and a Staff Sergeant.[citation needed]

Note the distinct lack of a weapons or engineer NCO. This is because the B-Team generally does not engage in direct operations, but rather operates in support of the A-Teams.[citation needed]

The following jobs are outside of the Special Forces 18-series Career Management Field (CMF), but hold positions on a Special Forces B-Team. Soldiers in these positions are not "Special Forces qualified", as they have not completed the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course (SFAS) or the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC or "Q Course):

  • The Supply NCO, usually a Staff Sergeant, the commander's principal logistical planner, works with the battalion S-4 to supply the company.
  • The Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) NCO, usually a Sergeant, maintains and operates the company's NBC detection and decontamination equipment, and assists in administering NBC defensive measures.[14]

[edit]Basic Element – SF Operational Detachment-A (SFODA) composition

A Special Forces company consists of usually six ODAs (Operational Detachments-A) or "A-Teams".[15][16] The number of ODAs can vary from company to company, with each ODA specializing in an infiltration skill or a particular mission-set (e.g. Military Freefall (HALO), combat diving, Air Assault, mountain warfare, maritime operations, or urban operations). An ODA is identified because of its group, company and the team itself. For example, ODA 111 would be the first team in the first Special Forces Company of the First Special Forces Group.

An ODA consists of 12 men, each of whom has a specific function (MOS or Military Occupational Specialty) on the team, however all members of an ODA conduct cross-training. The ODA is led by an 18A (Detachment Commander), usually a Captain, and a 180A (Assistant Detachment Commander) who is his second in command, usually a Warrant Officer One or Chief Warrant Officer Two. The team also includes the following enlisted men: one 18Z team sergeant (Operations Sergeant), usually a Master Sergeant, one 18F (Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant), usually a Sergeant First Class, and two each, 18Bs (Weapons Sergeant), 18Cs (Engineer Sergeant), 18Ds (Medical Sergeant), and 18Es (Communications Sergeant), usually Sergeants First Class, Staff Sergeants or Sergeants. This organization facilitates 6-man "split team" operations, redundancy, and mentoring between a senior specialist NCO and his junior assistant.

[edit]Selection and training

 This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.(February 2012)
Main article: United States Army Special Forces selection and training

The United States Army Special Forces soldier trains on a regular basis over the course of their entire career. The initial formal training program for entry into Special Forces is divided into four phases collectively known as the Special Forces Qualification Course or, informally, the "Q Course". The length of the Q Course changes depending on the applicant's primary job field within Special Forces and their assigned foreign language capability but will usually last between 55 to 95 weeks. After successfully completing the Special Forces Qualification Course, Special Forces soldiers are then eligible for many advanced skills courses. These include, but are not limited to, the Military Free Fall Parachutist Course (MFF), the Combat Diver Qualification Course and the Special Forces Sniper Course (SFSC).

[edit]Special Forces MOS descriptions

  • 18A – Special Forces Officer[17]
  • 180A – Special Forces Warrant Officer[18]
  • 18B – Special Forces Weapons Sergeant[19]
  • 18C – Special Forces Engineer Sergeant[20]
  • 18D – Special Forces Medical Sergeant[21]
  • 18E – Special Forces Communications Sergeant[22]
  • 18F – Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant
  • 18X – Special Forces Candidate (Active Duty Enlistment Option)[23]
  • 18Z – Special Forces Operations Sergeant

[edit]Uniforms and insignia

[edit]The Green Beret

Army Special Forces with Green Berets

The origins of the Green Beret which Special Forces personnel wear can be traced to Scotland during the Second World War. U.S. Army Rangers and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives who underwent training from the British Commandos were awarded the Green Beret upon completion of the grueling and revolutionary commando course. However, this green beret was not authorized by the U.S. Army among the Rangers and OSS operatives who earned them.Edson Raff, one of the first Special Forces officers, is credited with the re-birth of the green beret.[24] In 1961, President John F. Kennedy authorized them for use exclusively by the U.S. Special Forces. Preparing for an 12 October visit to the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the President sent word to the Center's commander, Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, for all Special Forces soldiers to wear green berets as part of the event. The President felt that since they had a special mission, Special Forces should have something to set them apart from the rest. In 1962, he called the green beret "a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom."

"It was President Kennedy who was responsible for the rebuilding of the Special Forces and giving us back our Green Beret," said Forrest Lindley, a writer for the newspaper Stars and Stripes who served with Special Forces in Vietnam. "People were sneaking around wearing it when conventional forces weren't in the area and it was sort of a cat and mouse game," he recalled. "When Kennedy authorized the Green Beret as a mark of distinction, everybody had to scramble around to find berets that were really green. We were bringing them down from Canada. Some were handmade, with the dye coming out in the rain."

Special Forces have a special bond with Kennedy, going back to his funeral. At the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of JFK's death, Gen. Michael D. Healy, the last commander of Special Forces in Vietnam, spoke at Arlington Cemetery. Later, a wreath in the form of the Green Beret would be placed on the grave, continuing a tradition that began the day of his funeral when a sergeant in charge of a detail of Special Forces men guarding the grave placed his beret on the coffin.[25]

The wearers of the Green Beret caught the public's imagination and were the subject of a best selling, if semi-fictional, book The Green Berets by Robin Moore,[26] a hit record, "Ballad of the Green Berets" performed and jointly (with Moore) written by Barry Sadler, who was himself a Green Beret, The Green Berets produced, directed and starring, John Wayne, and a comic strip and American comic book, Tales of the Green Beret, written by Robin Moore with artwork by Joe Kubert. See United States Army Special Forces in popular culture.

[edit]Insignia

1st Special Forces Regiment distinctive unit insignia, bearing the motto de oppresso liber

On a wreath of the colors (Argent and Sable), two arrows saltire-wise Argent - that is, two silver arrows crossed with a dagger, also silver, above them, surrounded by a black ribbon.

The crest is the crossed arrow collar (branch) insignia of the First Special Service Force (a joint World War II American-Canadian commando unit organized in 1942), but was changed from gold to silver to create visual harmony with the shield, as well as to make a difference from the collar insignia.[citation needed]

A silver color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches (2.86 cm), in height consisting of a pair of silver arrows in saltire, points up and surmounted at their junction by a silver dagger with black handle point up; all over and between a black motto scroll arcing to base and inscribed "DE OPPRESSO LIBER" in silver letters.[citation needed]

The motto is thought to translate from Latin to "Free From Oppression". However, the actual words are grammatically inaccurate, see De oppresso liber.

The distinctive unit insignia was approved on 8 July 1960. The insignia of the 1st Special Forces was authorized to be worn by personnel of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) and its subordinate units on 7 March 1991.[citation needed]

[edit]Cultural references

Main article: United States Army Special Forces in popular culture

[edit]See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)

[edit]References

  1. ^ Doug Stanton: The Quiet Professionals: The Untold Story of U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan
  2. ^ "Most Popular E-mail Newsletter". USA Today. 9 November 2011.
  3. ^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (17 December 2003). "Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations" (PDF). Retrieved 27 April 2008
  4. ^ Waller, Douglas C. (1994). The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing
  5. ^ (PDF) FM 3-05: Army Special Operations Forces. U.S. Department of the Army. September 2006
  6. ^ "FM 3-05.102 Army Special Forces Intelligence" (PDF). 2001-07.
  7. ^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993). "Joint Publication 3-05.5: Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures" (PDF). Retrieved 13 November 2007
  8. ^ Waller, Douglas (3 February 2003). "The CIA Secret Army". TIME (Time Inc). http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145-3,00.html
  9. ^ SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam by John L. Plaster
  10. ^ Haney, Eric L. (2002). Inside Delta Force. New York: Delacorte Press
  11. ^ Efran, Shawn (producer), "Army Officer Recalls Hunt For Bin Laden", 60 Minutes, CBS News, 5 October 2008.
  12. ^ Paddock, Alfred H. Jr.. "Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare". Retrieved 9 December 2007.[unreliable source?]
  13. ^ "United States Army Special Forces Command".
  14. ^ "Structure". Fort Campbell. United States Army. Archived from the original on 22 March 2007. Retrieved 8 March 2007.
  15. ^ USASOC. 'Special Forces – Shooters and thinkers'. WWW.ARMY.MIL The official homepage of the United States army (26 Oct 2009). Retrieved on 5 January 2010
  16. ^ Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFOD A)
  17. ^ Special Forces Officer | GoArmy.com
  18. ^ U.S. Army Recruiting Command's Warrant Officer Recruiting Information Site
  19. ^ Special Forces Weapons Sergeant | GoArmy.com
  20. ^ Special Forces Engineer Sergeant | GoArmy.com
  21. ^ Special Forces Medical Sergeant | GoArmy.com
  22. ^ Special Forces Communications Sergeant | GoArmy.com
  23. ^ Special Forces Candidate | GoArmy.com
  24. ^ "History: Special Forces Green Beret". Special Forces Search Engine. Retrieved 8 March 2007.
  25. ^ Gamarekian, Barbara (22 November 1988). "Washington Talk: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963; Hundreds Are in Capital For 25th Remembrance". New York Times.
  26. ^ Moore, Robin (2002). The Green Berets. St. Martin's Paperbacks. ISBN 9780312984922.

[edit]External links

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